This study examines the effects of bottleneck congestion and an optimal time-varying congestion toll on the spatial structure of cities. We develop a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city with a bottleneck located between a central downtown and an adjacent suburb. We then demonstrate that commuters sort themselves temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of travel time and their flexibility. Furthermore, we reveal that introducing an optimal congestion toll alters the urban spatial structure, which contrasts with the previous literature. We further demonstrate through an example that congestion tolling can cause the city to physically expand outward, which helps rich commuters but hurts poor commuters.
Introduction
Traditional residential location models describe the spatial structures of cities and their evolution based on the trade-off between land rent and commuting costs (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969) . Traditional and subsequent studies have successfully predicted the empirically observed patterns of residential location (e.g., the spatial distribution of rich and poor) and the effects of assorted urban policies. 1 However, most previous studies describe traffic congestion using static flow congestion models. Their use renders these models inappropriate for dealing with peak-period traffic congestion and for examining the effects of measures intended to alleviate it (e.g., time-varying congestion tolls, flextime, staggered work hours).
The bottleneck model can adequately describe peak-period congestion and how commuters choose their departure times from home (Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990b Arnott et al., , 1993 . Its simple, effective framework for studying the efficacy of various measures to alleviate peak-period congestion has inspired numerous extensions and modifications. The bottleneck model, however, cannot be easily applied in the context of the traditional residential location model, as stated by Ross and Yinger (2000) . Therefore, few studies have developed a model to describe how commuters choose where they live and when they depart from home. Arnott (1998) is the first and the most successful attempt to incorporate the bottleneck model into a residential location model. This study considered a (discrete space) monocentric city comprising two areas-a downtown and a suburb-connected by a single road with a bottleneck.
He showed that imposing an optimal congestion toll without redistributing its revenues affects neither commuting costs nor commuters' residential locations. This result fundamentally differs from the results given by traditional models with static flow congestion, which predict that cities become denser with congestion pricing (e.g., Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al., 1998) . However, Arnott (1998) assumed that commuters are homogeneous although it has been established that optimal congestion tolling changes commuting costs in bottleneck models with heterogeneous commuters (e.g., Arnott et al., 1992 Arnott et al., , 1994 van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011) . That is, the effects of congestion tolling in the bottleneck model with heterogeneous commuters can fundamentally differ from those in the model with homogeneous commuters. This study extends the model developed by Arnott (1998) to consider commuter heterogeneity and a continuous space monocentric city with a bottleneck located between a central downtown and an adjacent suburb. We systematically analyzed our model using the properties of complementarity problems that define the equilibrium. 2 Our analysis shows that commuters sort themselves both temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of travel time and their flexibility.
In addition, this study investigates the effects of an optimal time-varying congestion toll (i.e., alleviating peak-period congestion) on the urban spatial structure. We show that introducing a congestion toll (with and without redistributing its revenues) changes commuters' commuting costs, thereby altering their spatial distribution. To concretely demonstrate the effects of conges-1 Fujita (1989) , Glaeser et al. (2008) , Fujita and Thisse (2013) , and Duranton and Puga (2015) provided detailed overviews of traditional residential location models. For the effects of congestion pricing, see Kanemoto (1980) , Wheaton (1998) , and Anas et al. (1998) . Recently, Brueckner (2007) , Anas and Rhee (2007) , Joshi and Kono (2009) , Kono et al. (2008) ; Kono and Joshi (2012) , and Pines and Kono (2012) showed the efficiency of urban policies to substitute for congestion pricing (urban growth boundary, floor-to-area ratio regulations).
2 As we show in Appendix A, the equilibrium defined by the complementarity problems coincides with that obtained by the traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015) . tion tolling, we analyzed the model for a case in which commuters with a high value of travel time (rich commuters) are highly inflexible. 3 This analysis indicates that congestion tolling reduces the commuting costs of suburban commuters, thereby increasing the suburban population.
Furthermore, the population increase in the suburb causes the city to physically expand outward and induces higher density and land rent at suburban locations and lower density and land rent at downtown locations. This finding contrasts not only with the standard results of traditional location models with static flow congestion (congestion tolling results in a denser urban spatial structure), but also with those of Arnott (1998) (tolling has no effect on urban spatial structure).
This implies that interactions among heterogeneous commuters change the effects of congestion tolling on urban spatial structure. We further demonstrate that, although the optimal congestion toll (without toll-revenue redistribution) generates a Pareto improvement in this case if commuters do not relocate (Arnott et al., 1994; Hall, 2015) , this is not true if we consider commuters' relocation. Moreover, since rich commuters reside downtown and poor commuters reside in the suburbs, congestion tolling leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits: rich commuters gain, whereas poor commuters lose.
There are a few studies that considered both bottleneck congestion and commuters' location choice as in Arnott (1998) . 4 Gubins and Verhoef (2014) considered a (continuous space) monocentric closed city with a bottleneck at the entrance to its central business district (CBD). Their model introduced an incentive for commuters to spend time at home, which the standard bottleneck model disregards, 5 and assumed that a commuters' house size affects their marginal utility of spending time at home. They demonstrated that congestion tolling causes commuters to spend more time at home and to have larger houses, leading to the physical expansion of the city. Fosgerau et al. (2016) considered the same spatial structure as in Gubins and Verhoef (2014) , but assumed that the city is open. 6 They defined the social optimum as the global maximizer of total revenue from congestion tolling and land rents and showed that the optimal policy induces lower density in the center and higher density farther out. In their models, however, commuters are assumed to be homogeneous. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically analyze the model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure time from home and residential location. This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city. Sections 3 and 4 characterize equilibrium in our model without and with tolling using the properties of complementarity problems, respectively. Section 5 presents the effects of the optimal time-varying congestion toll. Section 6 concludes the study. 
Assumptions
We consider a long narrow city with a spaceless CBD, where all job opportunities are located. The CBD is located at the edge of the city, and a residential location is indexed by distance x from the CBD (Figure 1 ). Land is uniformly distributed with unit density along a road. As is common in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords. 7 The road has a single bottleneck with capacity µ at location d > 0. If arrival rates at the bottleneck exceed its capacity, a queue develops.
To model queuing congestion, we employ first-in-first-out (FIFO) and a point queue, in which vehicles have no physical length as in standard bottleneck models (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993) . Free-flow travel time per unit distance is assumed to be constant at τ > 0 (i.e., free-flow speed is 1/τ).
There are I types of commuters, each of whom must travel from home to the CBD and who have the same preferred arrival time t * at work. They differ in their income, value of travel time, and schedule delay costs. The number of commuters of type i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, · · · , I}, whom we call "commuters i," is fixed and denoted by N i . Since the bottleneck is located at d, only commuters who reside at x > d pass through it, whereas those who reside at
Following Arnott (1998) , we denote locations X s = {x ∈ R + | x > d} as "suburb" and locations 
Commuting cost c i (x, t) of commuters i who reside at x and arrive at work at time t is expressed as the sum of travel time cost m i (x, t) and schedule delay cost s i (t − t * ):
where q(t) denotes the queuing time of commuters arriving at work at time t, τx represents free- 7 We can make the alternative assumption that land is publicly owned and that the aggregate land rent is equally redistributed to all commuters. The results under this assumption are essentially identical to those obtained with absentee landlords since we assume that the utility function u is quasi-linear (i.e., income elasticity of demand for land is zero). flow travel time of commuters residing at x, and α i > 0 is the value of travel time of commuters i. β i > 0 and γ i > 0 are early and late delay costs per unit time, respectively. We assume α i > β i for all i ∈ I so that an equilibrium in our model satisfies the FIFO property (i.e., vehicles must leave the bottleneck in the same order as their arrival at the bottleneck). We also assume the value of travel time α i of commuters i is positively correlated to their income w i .
The utility of commuters i who reside at x and arrive at work at time t is given by the following quasi-linear utility function 8 :
where z i (x, t) denotes consumption of the numéraire goods, a i (x) is the lot size at x, and f (a i (x)) is the utility from land consumption. We assume f (x) is a strictly increasing, concave, and twice differentiable function for x > 0. We also assume lim x→0+ f
) and the hyperbolic ( f (x) = − κ 2x ) utility functions are examples satisfying these assumptions. 9 The budget constraint is expressed as
where r A > 0 is exogenous agricultural rent and r(x) + r A denotes land rent at x.
The first-order condition of the utility maximization problem gives
where the prime denotes differentiation. Since the marginal utility of land consumption is infinity at a i (x) = 0, we must have a i (x) > 0 and
where g(·) is the inverse function of f ′ (·). This implies that lot size a i (x) is independent of commuters' type i as well as commuting cost (and congestion toll levels) c i (x, t) . Therefore, we denote lot size at x by a(x).
From (2), (3), and (5), we obtain the indirect utility v i (x, t) as follows:
where
is a strictly decreasing function.
Equilibrium conditions
Similar to models in Peer and Verhoef (2013) , Gubins and Verhoef (2014) , and Takayama (2015), we assume commuters make long-run decisions about residential location and short-run decisions 8 As Arnott (1998) proved, if commuters are homogeneous, congestion tolling does not affect their spatial distribution under a quasi-linear utility function (2). 9 The same utility function has been introduced by, e.g., Blanchet et al. (2016) and .
about day-specific trip timing. In the short run, commuters i minimize commuting cost c i (x, t) by selecting their arrival time t at work taking their residential location x as given. In the long run, each commuter i chooses a residential location x so as to maximize his/her utility. We therefore formalize the short-and long-run equilibrium conditions.
Short-run equilibrium conditions
Commuters in the short run determine only their day-specific arrival time t at work, which implies that the number N i (x) of commuters i residing at x (i.e., spatial distribution of commuters i) is assumed to be a given. Since commuting costs are given by (1), short-run equilibrium conditions differ according to commuters' residential locations. We first consider commuters residing in the suburb (suburban commuters), who must traverse the bottleneck. The commuting cost c (t) owing to queuing congestion and a schedule delay depending only on arrival time t:
This implies that each suburban commuter chooses arrival time t so as to minimize bottleneck cost (t). Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions coincide with those in the standard bottleneck model, which are given by three conditions: ] of suburban commuters i ∈ I. This implies that, at the short-run equilibrium, the bottleneck cost of suburban commuters i depends on N s but not on N i (x).
We next consider commuters who reside downtown (downtown commuters). Since these 10 Note that the departure rate from the bottleneck coincides with the arrival rate of suburban commuters at the CBD. commuters do not traverse the bottleneck, their commuting cost c
Thus, all downtown commuters will arrive at t = t * , and their commuting cost at the short-run equilibrium is given by α i τx.
Long-run equilibrium conditions
In the long run, each commuter i chooses a residential location x so as to maximize indirect utility v i (x), which is expressed as
where y i (x) denotes the income net of commuting cost earned by commuters i residing at x. Thus, long-run equilibrium conditions are given by
where v * i denotes the long-run equilibrium utility of commuters i.
Condition (11a) is the equilibrium condition for commuters' choice of residential location.
This condition implies that, at the long-run equilibrium, no commuter has incentive to change residential location unilaterally. Condition (11b) is the land market clearing condition. This condition requires that, if total land demand ∑ k∈I a(x)N k (x) for housing at x equals supply 1, land rent r(x) + r A is (weakly) larger than agricultural rent r A . Condition (11c) expresses the population constraint.
Note that the traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015) is equivalent to our approach using complementarity problems, as shown in Appendix A. More precisely, long-run equilibrium conditions (11) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach.
11 Therefore, even if we used the traditional bid-rent approach, we would obtain the same results as those presented in this study.
Substituting (5) into (11b), we obtain r(x) as follows:
11 The equivalence between the bid-rent and our approaches has been shown in Fujita (1989, Chapter 2). where
represents the total number of commuters residing at x. It follows from (10a) and (12) that the equilibrium conditions in (11) are rewritten as (11a) and (11c) with (10a) and
is a strictly decreasing function; that is, the net utility from land consumption decreases as the number of residents increases.
To study the spatial distribution of commuters, it is useful to rewrite the equilibrium conditions (11a) and (11c) as follows: Conditions (14a) and (14b) are equilibrium conditions for suburban commuters' choice of residential location x. Similarly, conditions (14c) and (14d) are those for downtown commuters' choice of residential location x. Conditions (14e) and (14f) are equilibrium conditions for commuters' choice between residing in the suburb and downtown. We use these conditions to characterize the equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters in Section 3.
Equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium
The short-run equilibrium conditions (8) of suburban commuters coincide with those in the standard bottleneck model, as shown above. Therefore, we can invoke the results of studies utilizing the bottleneck model to characterize the short-run equilibrium (Arnott et al., 1994; Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Liu et al., 2015) . In particular, the following properties of the short-run equilibrium are useful for investigating the properties of our model. (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007) .
(ii) The short-run equilibrium number [n s * i
(t)] of suburban commuters arriving at time t coincides with the solution of the following linear programming problem:
Let us define (travel) time-based cost as the cost converted into equivalent travel time. Since that cost for commuters i is given by dividing the cost by α i , we say that s i (t − t * )/α i represents the time-based schedule delay cost of commuters i. Therefore, Lemma 1 (ii) shows that, at the short-run equilibrium, the total time-based schedule delay cost is minimized, but the total schedule delay cost is not necessarily minimized.
We let supp (n
(t) > 0} be the support of the short-run equilibrium number n s * i (t) of suburban commuters i who arrive at work at t. From Lemma 1 (ii), we then have
where t E and t L denote the earliest and latest arrival times of commuters, which satisfy
This indicates that, at the short-run equilibrium, a rush hour in which queuing congestion occurs must be a single time interval (Figure 2 ).
Furthermore, by using short-run equilibrium condition (8a), we obtain
Substituting (7) into this, we have the following conditions as given in Arnott et al. (1994) and Liu et al. (2015) : for any t i ∈ supp (n
, and i, j ∈ I,
These conditions indicate that the short-run equilibrium has the following properties: if marginal time-based early delay cost of commuters i is lower than that of commuters j (i.e., β i /α i < β j /α j ), early-arriving commuters i (commuters i arriving at the CBD before the preferred arrival time t * ) arrive at the CBD earlier than early-arriving commuters j; if the marginal timebased late delay cost of commuters i is lower than that of commuters j (i.e., γ i /α i < γ j /α j ), latearriving commuters i (commuters i arriving after t * ) arrive later than late-arriving commuters j.
This occurs because commuters with a lower time-based schedule delay cost avoid queuing time rather than a schedule delay. This result shows that, at the short-run equilibrium, commuters sort themselves temporally on the basis of their marginal time-based schedule delay cost.
In the following analysis, we make the following assumption about marginal early and late delay costs, which is common to the literature employing a bottleneck model with commuter heterogeneity (Vickrey, 1973; Arnott et al., 1992 Arnott et al., , 1994 van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Hall, 2015) .
This assumption implies that commuters with a high early delay cost also have a higher late delay Assumption 2.
Then, from (19), early-arriving (late-arriving) commuters with smaller i arrive later (earlier) at the short-run equilibrium. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, therefore, the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost c b * i (N s ) of suburban commuters i is derived by following the procedure employed in literature featuring bottleneck models with commuter heterogeneity (see, e.g., van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011):
This clearly shows that richer or more inflexible commuters incur higher bottleneck costs at the short-run equilibrium.
Properties of the short-run equilibrium obtained above can be summarized as follows. We see from this proposition that the indirect utility (13) is uniquely determined. Therefore, in the following subsection, we characterize the long-run equilibrium by using the properties of the complementarity problems (14).
Long-run equilibrium 3.2.1 Suburban and downtown spatial structures
We first examine the properties of suburban and downtown spatial structures at the long-run equilibrium using the properties of equilibrium conditions (14a), (14b), (14c), and (14d). We therefore consider in this subsection that the suburban and downtown populations are given.
From equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c), we see there is no vacant location between any two populated locations, as shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The long-run equilibrium number N * (x) of commuters residing at x has the following properties:
where X B denotes the residential location for commuters farthest from the CBD (city boundary).
(x) be the respective long-run equilibrium number of suburban and downtown commuters i residing at x. Then, it follows from Lemma 2 that, for any x
In addition, equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c) give the following conditions for N s * i
Substituting (23) into (24) yields the following conditions: for any
and i, j ∈ I,
This condition also holds for any
), and i, j ∈ I. This condition states that richer suburban commuters reside closer to the CBD to reduce their free-flow travel time cost. This property also holds for downtown commuters. This implies that suburban and downtown commuters sort themselves spatially on the basis of their value of travel time.
Furthermore, spatial distribution of suburban commuters and that of downtown commuters are unaffected by the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost c
In our model, the free-flow travel time cost is more income elastic than the demand for land since we assume that the income elasticity of demand for land is zero. Therefore, this result is in accordance with the well-known result of traditional location models considering different groups with heterogeneous income levels (Fujita, 1989) , which show that rich commuters reside closer to the CBD if the income elasticity of commuting costs is larger than the income elasticity of demand for land.
12
By using condition (25), we can obtain the spatial distribution of commuters N(x), land rent r(x), and lot size a(x). For this, we introduce the following assumption.
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Assumption 3.
This means that commuters with small i are richer than those with large i. 
] for all i ∈ I). Therefore, we have
These, together with the population constraints (14b) and (14d), lead to the following lemma. 
Recall that H(r) = f (g(r)) − rg(r), and thus h(N(X s i
d is obtained from the following condition:
This condition means that, if
condition (29), because the following conditions hold:
where the second condition follows from H ′ (·) = −g(·) and lim r→∞ g(r) = 0 (lim a→0+ f ′ (a) = ∞).
By using (26), (27), and (28), we obtain Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumption 3. Then at the long-run equilibrium, (i) the city boundary X B is given by
(ii) the number N(x) of commuters, lot size a(x), and land rent r(x) + r A are given by
where h −1 (·) is the inverse function of h(·) and
Proof. ) + r A ), we have (31). (32) is obtained from the straightforward calculation of (4), (12), and (26) . □ It follows from this lemma that, for any i, j ∈ I,
).
This shows that the city boundary moves outward as the suburban population increases. That is, a population increase in the suburb leads to the physical expansion of the city. Furthermore, it induces higher density and land rent at any populated suburban location and lower density and land rent at any populated downtown location. We see from this lemma that the long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of suburban com- In addition, the long-run equilibrium conditions (14a), (14b), (14c), and (14d) are equivalent to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the following optimization problem:
suburban commuters is a long-run equilibrium if and only if it is a KKT point of the following optimization problem:
max [N i (x)] ∫ ∞ d        ∑ k∈I { w k − α k τx − c s * k (N s ) + f ( 1 N(x) ) } N k (x) − r A        dx (34a) s.t. ∫ ∞ d N i (x)dx = N s i ∀i ∈ I, N i (x) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀x ∈ R + . (34b) Furthermore, the spatial distribution [N * i (x)] (x ∈ X d ) of
downtown commuters is a long-run equilibrium if and only if it is a KKT point of the following optimization problem:
Since 1 N(x) equals the lot size a(x) and f ′ ( 1 N(x) ) equals the market land rent at location x, the objective functions of (34) and (35) represent the total surplus
dx of the suburb and the downtown, respectively. Hence, this lemma demonstrates that the land market is efficient in both the suburb and downtown, as in the traditional residential location model (Fujita, 1989) . Note that since the number N s of suburban commuters is taken as given, Lemma 5 does not indicate that the long-run equilibrium is efficient but instead shows that market failures in our model are caused only by traffic (bottleneck) congestion. (iv) The total surplus of the suburb and that of the downtown are maximized.
Population of suburban and downtown commuters
We next characterize the long-run equilibrium number
] of suburban and downtown commuters i under Assumptions 3 and 4 by using equilibrium conditions (14e) and (14f). From (28) and Lemma 4, utilities that commuters receive from residing in the suburb and downtown are given by 
The difference in utility of commuters with high bottleneck cost c b * i (N s ) or small i grows. More specifically, because the utility difference satisfies
where c
denotes the commuting cost difference between suburban and downtown commuters i, commuters with a large commuting cost difference have a greater utility difference. Since the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost (N s ) for any N s and i ∈ I\{1}; that is, the income elasticity of commuting cost differences is positive. Thus, we have
for any N s and i ∈ I\{1}. This implies that there exists i * ∈ I such that of suburban commuters exists uniquely and is given by
where ϕ ∈ [0, 1] is uniquely determined from
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3-5. Then the long-run equilibrium number of suburban and downtown commuters is uniquely determined. Furthermore, at the long-run equilibrium, commuters with a high value of travel time reside downtown and commuters with a low value of travel time reside in the suburb.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that, under Assumptions 1 and 3-5, rich and inflexible commuters reside closer to the CBD since rich commuters have a higher commuting cost. Note that introducing Assumptions 3 and 5 implies that the income elasticity of commuting costs is positive and larger than the income elasticity of demand for land. Therefore, this result is consistent with the wellknown result given by the traditional location model (Fujita, 1989 ).
Although we mainly focus on this type of heterogeneity to clearly demonstrate the properties of our model, in other cases, we can have different equilibrium spatial distributions of commuters. As an example, we consider the opposite case: poor commuters are highly inflexible and rich commuters are highly flexible. In this case, the bottleneck cost of poor commuters can be much higher than that of rich commuters, such that c
) for some N s and i ∈ I under Assumption 3 (i.e., income elasticity of commuting cost differences is negative). This, together with (38), implies that poor commuters can reside downtown at the long-run equilibrium. This result occurs because commuters who are relatively rich but highly flexible are able to traverse the bottleneck early or late to avoid queuing congestion at a low cost. This will save them a significant amount on their lot size, with a fairly small bottleneck cost. Thus, they prefer to do so. Likewise, commuters who are relatively poor but highly inflexible can avoid their incredibly costly traversing of the bottleneck by paying to reside downtown. Therefore, we can say that, in our model, commuters sort into residing in the suburb or downtown based on their value of travel time and their flexibility.
Optimal congestion toll
Studies utilizing the standard bottleneck model show that queuing time is a pure deadweight loss. Hence, in our model, there is no queue at the social optimum, and the social optimum can be achieved by imposing an optimal time-varying congestion toll that eliminates queuing congestion, as shown later. This section considers the introduction of an optimal congestion toll p(t) and characterizes equilibrium under this pricing policy.
Short-run equilibrium
Congestion toll p(t) eliminates queuing congestion. 14 Thus, the commuting cost c t i
Superscript t describes variables under the congestion toll. Since we consider heterogeneous
commuters, congestion toll p(t) does not equal queuing time cost α i q(t) at the no-toll equilibrium and is
set so that travel demand ∑ i∈I n st i (t) at the bottleneck equals supply (i.e., capacity) µ. Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions for suburban commuters are expressed as
Condition (44a) is the no-arbitrage condition for suburban commuters' arrival time choices. Condition (44b) denotes the bottleneck's capacity constraints, which assure that queuing congestion is eliminated at the equilibrium. Condition (44c) provides the flow conservation for commuting demand. From these conditions, we have n st i (t), p(t), and c bt * i at the short-run equilibrium as functions of the number N st of suburban commuters i ∈ I.
As in the case without the congestion toll, by invoking the results of studies employing the bottleneck model, we have Lemma 6 Lemma 6 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007 
Lemma 6 (ii) suggests that total schedule delay cost is minimized at the short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll. Note that total schedule delay cost equals total commuting cost minus total toll revenue. Hence, Lemma 6 (ii) indicates that, in the short run, the optimal congestion toll minimizes the social cost of commuting.
From equilibrium condition (44a), we have
Thus, the following condition is obtained by substituting (43b) into (46): for any t i ∈ supp (n st * i ),
), and i, j ∈ I,
This condition indicates that early-arriving commuters arrive at the CBD in order of increasing β i and that late-arriving commuters arrive in order of decreasing γ i under the congestion toll.
Since commuters with a high marginal time-based schedule delay cost arrive closer to their preferred arrival time at the no-toll equilibrium, imposing the congestion toll alters the arrival order of commuters. 
This result and Lemmas 1 and 6 reveal that the equilibrium bottleneck cost under the congestion toll
This shows that inflexible commuters have higher bottleneck costs at the equilibrium under the congestion toll, which is fundamentally different from the properties of the no-toll equilibrium bottleneck cost.
We summarize the properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the following properties. (i) Total schedule delay cost is minimized. (ii) Early-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of increasing marginal early delay cost (β i ).
Late As in the case without tolling, downtown commuters arrive at t = t * , as they need not traverse the bottleneck. That is, the commuting cost of downtown commuters i at the short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll is given by α i τx.
Long-run equilibrium
We characterize the long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters by using the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost. In the long-run, the difference between cases with and without tolling appears only in the indirect utility of suburban commuters. Specifically, under the congestion toll, the indirect utility v st i (x) of suburban commuters i is expressed as
where r t (x) + r A denotes the land rent at x under the congestion toll. The long-run equilibrium conditions are thus represented as (11) with the use of (49).
Following the same procedure as in Section 3.2 reveals that the urban spatial structure at the long-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the same properties as those without tolling (Propositions 2 and 3). Note that this proposition does not suggest that the urban structure at the long-run equilibrium with tolling coincides with that at the no-toll long-run equilibrium. Indeed, imposing a congestion toll can change the number of suburban and downtown commuters since it changes the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost. Therefore, this proposition demonstrates that differences between the long-run equilibria with and without tolling arise only when the long-run equilibrium number (N s * and N st * ) of suburban commuters changes by tolling. In the next section, we will show the effects of tolling on the urban spatial structure by examining differences between N s * and N st * .
Before studying the effects of tolling, we show that the social optimum is achieved by imposing the congestion toll. We define the social optimum as the global maximizer of commuters' total utility subject to budget, land, bottleneck capacity, and population constraints:
Then we have Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The KKT conditions of problem (50) coincide with the short-run and long-run equilibrium conditions under the congestion toll.
Proof. See Appendix D □
This proposition shows that the social optimum is a long-run equilibrium under the congestion toll, which indicates that market failures are caused only by bottleneck congestion in our model.
Effects of congestion toll on urban spatial structure
Long-run equilibria with and without tolling
This section demonstrates that imposing the congestion toll alters urban spatial structure. As discussed in the previous section, the difference between the long-run equilibria with and without tolling arises when the number of suburban and downtown commuters (N s and N d ) changes by imposing the congestion toll. Therefore, to examine effects of the congestion toll, we compare the number of suburban commuters at the long-run equilibria with and without tolling.
We denote the utilities of commuters i residing in the suburb and downtown under the congestion toll by v 
where X st k and X dt k are, respectively, residential locations for suburban and downtown commuters i closest to the CBD, which are given by the same functional form as in the no-toll equilibrium (i.e., (28)
It follows from this and (37) that
This leads to Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4. Then for any N s and i ∈ I\{1},
if and only if there exists δ such that c
This proposition implies that the urban spatial structure does not change by imposing the congestion toll if c
However, in general, this condition does not hold when commuters are heterogeneous in their value of travel time, as discussed in Section 4.1. This means that imposing the optimal congestion toll changes the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost and creates incentives for commuters to relocate. Unlike Arnott (1998) , therefore, congestion tolling does alter the urban spatial structure in our model. It is, however, difficult to examine how the urban spatial structure changes by imposing the congestion toll. Therefore, the following subsection analyzes our model in a simple setting to elucidate the effects of tolling.
Note that the results presented thus far were obtained under the assumption that toll revenues are not redistributed. Since the optimal congestion toll minimizes the short-run social cost of traversing the bottleneck, bottleneck costs for all suburban commuters can be reduced. More specifically, if policymakers can observe the type of commuters, they can redistribute toll revenue to suburban commuters such that
where ρ i (N s ) denotes the toll-revenue redistribution for each suburban commuter i (type-specific lump-sum rebate). Thus, under this toll-revenue redistribution ρ i (N s ), the following condition is satisfied for any N s and i ∈ I: 
A simple example
Theoretical analysis
We consider a simple setting to show concretely the effects of the congestion toll on urban spatial structure. Specifically, we suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. 15 That is, rich commuters are assumed to have a higher marginal time-based schedule delay cost. This implies that rich commuters tend to avoid a schedule delay rather than queuing time and paying the toll.
As Hall (2015) shows, this is a situation wherein congestion tolling does not alter the arrival order of commuters and generates a Pareto improvement if every commuter does not relocate.
Indeed, it follows from (20) and (48) that the difference between short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs with and without tolling is non-positive for any N s :
This shows that the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost incurred by the poorest commuters does not change. This reflects the fact that the poorest commuters are the most inflexible and have the highest time-based marginal schedule delay cost. That is, commuters who face no queuing cost at the equilibrium without tolling and face no toll at the equilibrium with tolling are the poorest ones.
We see from (57) that congestion tolling weakly decreases short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs of all commuters. However, as we see later, congestion tolling cannot lead to a Pareto improvement if we consider commuters' relocation. Moreover, rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from imposing the congestion toll.
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We first examine the effects of tolling on urban spatial structure. It follows from (53) and (57) that, for any N s and i ∈ I,
This clearly indicates that imposing the congestion toll can create incentives for commuters to reside in the suburb. Since the long-run equilibria with and without tolling are uniquely determined, this result leads to
This implies that imposing the congestion toll can increase the suburban population. Furthermore, it follows from Propositions 2 and 4 that if there exists i ∈ I such that N
where superscripts * and t * describe variables at the long-run equilibria without and with tolling, respectively. This indicates that the population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward and induces higher (lower) density and land rents at any populated suburban (downtown) location.
This finding is in contrast to the standard results (cities become denser with congestion pricing) of traditional location models, which consider static flow congestion (Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al., 1998) . It also differs from the results (the urban spatial structure does not change by tolling) obtained by Arnott (1998) , who considers homogeneous commuters. This thereby demonstrates that interactions among heterogeneous commuters may cause the physical expansion of the city resulting from imposition of the optimal congestion toll.
We next examine changes in commuters' utility due to the population increase in the suburb. 
R . This shows that rich commuters i ∈ I R gain from the population increase in the suburb.
The poorest commuters I reside farthest from the CBD at the long-run equilibria with and without tolling. Therefore, their utility difference is equal to the commuting cost difference:
Furthermore, (20) and (48) yield The results obtained in this subsection can be summarized as follows. In the short-run, congestion tolling reduces bottleneck costs of all commuters except those incurred by the poorest commuters, creating incentives for downtown commuters to reside in the suburb. Furthermore, commuters' relocation from downtown to the suburb causes downtown rents to fall and utilities to 
Numerical analysis
We numerically analyze our model and show effects of the optimal congestion toll. In this analysis, we assume f (a) = κ ln[a] and use the following parameter values: 
The values of α i , β i , and η are set to be consistent with the empirical result (Small, 1982) and Assumptions 1-4.
[ 
We conduct comparative statics with respect to bottleneck capacity µ. The no-toll equilibrium number of commuters i ∈ I is presented in Figure 3 . This figure shows that downtown commuters relocate to the suburb in order of decreasing i with increases in bottleneck capacity. They do so because increasing µ reduces bottleneck cost are homogeneous). Thus, congestion tolling does not affect the commuting costs of suburban commuters, as shown in Arnott (1998) . Furthermore, a suburban population increase attributable to congestion tolling leads to expansion of the city boundary X B , as illustrated in Figure 6 . That is, imposing the optimal congestion toll causes the physical expansion of the city. Figure 7 indicates that congestion tolling reduces the utility of commuters 4 (i.e., commuters with the lowest value of time). That is, the poorest commuters lose from congestion tolling. We also see from Figures 5-7 that the difference between equilibria without and with tolling increases in two ranges of µ where N s * is constant. This occurs because, in these ranges, increases in bottleneck capacity do not alter the suburban population at the no-toll equilibrium but increase its population at the equilibrium with tolling. These results are also consistent with those presented in Section 5.2.1.
Conclusion
This study has developed a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure time from home and residential locations in a monocentric city with a single bottleneck. By using the properties of the complementarity problem, we systematically examined the spatial distribution of commuters and the effects of time-varying congestion tolling. The results indicate that commuters sort themselves temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of time and their flexibility. Furthermore, imposing an optimal congestion toll alters the urban spatial structure. This finding differs fundamentally from the results obtained by Arnott (1998) , who considered homogeneous commuters. Our finding thus also suggests that interactions among heterogeneous commuters change the effects of congestion tolling.
In addition, we used a simple example to demonstrate that imposing a congestion toll without redistributing toll revenues causes the physical expansion of the city, which is opposite to the standard results of traditional location models considering static traffic flow congestion. This difference arises from the following reasons: in the traditional residential location model, imposing a congestion toll makes commuting more expensive; in our model, however, tolling eliminates the queuing congestion; hence, it can make commuting less expensive. We further show that, although congestion tolling generates a Pareto improvement in this example when commuters do not relocate, it leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits among commuters: rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from tolling. These results suggest that considering commuter heterogeneity and commuters' residential location choice is important when we examine the efficacy of transportation policies intended to alleviate peak-period congestion. This study made simplifying assumptions that each commuter traverses only one bottleneck and that rich commuters are more inflexible than poor commuters. Furthermore, although we considered the quasi-linear utility function, it is well known that the income elasticity of demand for land is positive. Therefore, it is important to examine the robustness of our results by analyzing a model with multiple bottlenecks, 17 general heterogeneity, 18 and other utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas utility. In addition, it would be valuable for future research to investigate effects of policies other than optimal congestion tolling, such as step tolls (Arnott et al., 1990a; Laih, 1994 Laih, , 2004 Lindsey et al., 2012) and transportation demand management measures for alleviating traffic congestion (Mun and Yonekawa, 2006; Takayama, 2015) .
A Equivalence between the bid-rent and complementarity approaches
We show that long-run equilibrium conditions (11) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach. The condition (11a) can be rewritten as
or equivalently,
) is given by 
B Proof of Lemma 2
We can show that, for any 
Therefore, the long-run equilibrium number N * (x) of commuters residing at x satisfies
Furthermore, it follows from long-run equilibrium conditions (14a) and ( 
C Proof of Lemma 3
It follows from (26) that N(x) and dN(x) dx are given by
where h −1 (·) is the inverse function of h(·). Hence, the population constraints (14b) and ( 
This proves Proposition 6.
